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Hazard Function Deployment: a QFD based tool for the assessment of working 1 
tasks – A practical study in the construction industry 2 
Despite the efforts made, the number of accidents has not significantly decreased in the 3 
construction industry. The main reasons can be found in the peculiarities of working activities 4 
in this sector, where hazard analysis and safety management result in being more difficult than 5 
in other industries. To deal with these problems, a comprehensive approach for hazard 6 
analysis is needed, focusing on the activities in which a working task is articulated since they 7 
are characterized by different types of hazards and thus risk levels. The study proposes a 8 
methodology that integrates the Quality Function Deployment (QFD) and Analytic Network 9 
Process (ANP) methods to correlate working activities, hazardous events and possible 10 
consequences. This provides a more effective decision making, while reducing the ambiguity 11 
of the qualitative assessment criteria. The results achieved can augment the knowledge on the 12 
usability of QFD in safety research, providing a basis for its application for further studies. 13 
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1. Introduction 21 
In recent years, standards and regulations concerning occupational safety have become more and 22 
more rigorous. Despite such an effort, the number of accidents and victims is still significant and 23 
  
the construction sector is certainly one of the most affected by this situation [1-6]. For example, in 24 
the European Union (EU), the statistics and reports related to construction accidents show that, 25 
although a reduction of the overall number of accidents was registered in recent years, the average 26 
number of fatalities is still significant at about 1.000 cases per year and over 800.000 workers are 27 
injured [7].  28 
The main reasons for this situation are due to the specific characteristics of the sector [8-10]. 29 
As a matter of fact, the large variety of activities usually carried out by companies, the use of 30 
obsolete machinery and equipment, the continuous change of workplaces, and the simultaneous use 31 
of the working site by different companies, are all factors that make the management of safety 32 
issues a difficult task to deal with [11-15]. To achieve effective results, safety managers should 33 
adopt a proactive hazard identification and elimination approach [16]. In addition, Underwood and 34 
Waterson [17] underlined the need of a holistic approach for risk assessment in order to better 35 
understand and evaluate the interactions among the operator, the technical systems, and the working 36 
environment. In such a context, Mitropoulos et al. [18] emphasized the role of the analysis of the 37 
working task characteristics in construction accidents, as the normative approaches do not consider 38 
the characteristics of the working processes properly. Working tasks should be considered with 39 
more attention, since ensuring the safety of the various tasks performed in a construction site can be 40 
the precondition for ensuring a higher level of safety at both project and company levels [10, 19]. 41 
Parise et al. [20] argued that an extensive effort is required to develop a hazard assessment approach 42 
based on the analysis of the specific tasks executed in a construction site. Accordingly, Zhou et al. 43 
[21] remarked the lack of construction safety research on the specific working tasks. Furthermore, 44 
the relevance of accidents related to the use of machinery and work equipment in a construction site 45 
was pointed out in numerous studies (e.g. in [22-27]). Accordingly, Jaafar et al. [28] remarked that 46 
the leading causes of this situation are mainly due to the operators’ unsafe behavior, as well as to 47 
the lack of the proper management of the work equipment. Hence, when performing risk assessment 48 
of a working task such as the use of a work equipment, all of the specific activities related to its use 49 
  
and management (e.g. setting, operating, maintaining, cleaning, etc.) should be considered, since 50 
they can present different levels of risk [29]. To address these concerns, a more user-centred 51 
approach is needed to investigate the different phases that characterize the use of a machinery or an 52 
equipment in practice [30].  53 
On these considerations, it is clear that safety managers /professionals need to implement a 54 
risk assessment approach in order to provide companies with information concerning potential 55 
hazards as well as prevention and improvement measures (i.e. a safety plan) based on the specific 56 
working activities carried out. To deal with such an issue, several studies suggested the use of the 57 
Quality Function Deployment (QFD) method [31] as a means of performing hazard analysis and 58 
risk assessment of the working tasks in a holistic manner [32, 33]. In particular, both Liu and Tsai 59 
[34] and Bas [35] focused on the use of QFD to perform risk assessment concerning the working 60 
tasks in the construction industry. These two studies propose effective procedures for safety 61 
management at a general level. However, at a practical level, a more specific and hands-on 62 
approach should be adopted, in order to make its use easier also in the case of Small and Medium-63 
sized Enterprises (SMEs), which often rely on external professional services to carry out the 64 
activities related to the protection and prevention of occupational risks, due to the lack of internal 65 
resources [11, 36-39]. To address these issues, the paper presents a procedure for the hazard 66 
analysis of the working activities related to the use of a work equipment, which takes into account 67 
all of the foreseeable phases of its usage. In other words, this study is an attempt to answer the 68 
following research question: How to correlate the activities concerning a working task (e.g. the use 69 
of a work equipment), the related hazardous situations and events, and their corresponding 70 
prevention and improvement measures in an effective and thorough manner? 71 
With this goal in mind, we propose a risk assessment methodology based on the use of 72 
QFD, augmented by the integration of the Analytic Network Process (ANP) approach [40]. Its 73 
validity was verified by means of a practical case study concerning the use of an in-transit concrete 74 
mixer, which was carried out in collaboration with two companies operating in the construction 75 
  
industry. In such a context, the working task is the use and management of the machinery which 76 
consist of a set of working activities (e.g. preparation of the concrete mixer, concrete discharge, 77 
maintenance and cleaning, etc.).  78 
The remainder of the paper is articulated as follows. In Section 2, the background and 79 
research motivations are introduced. Section 3 presents our research approach, while its application 80 
to the case study is described in section 4. Then, Section 5 discusses the results achieved and 81 
Section 6 concludes the article addressing further work. 82 
2. Background and motivations 83 
The need to focus on the relationships between the operator, the working system and the working 84 
environment when performing risk assessment activities has been largely discussed in the literature, 85 
as notably remarked by Karwowski [41]. Dealing with these issues requires a holistic approach [42-86 
45], which should take into account the feedback from the system’s (i.e. the equipment) users [46, 87 
47]. In such a context, several studies proposed the use QFD as a means of carrying out hazard 88 
analysis and risk assessment activities in a holistic manner, through the analysis of the inter-89 
relationships and interactions among hazards, causes, effects and their consequences [30, 33-35, 90 
48].  91 
The core of the method is certainly the so-called “House of Quality” (HoQ), whose 92 
innermost part is represented by the relationship matrix, which links customer needs and 93 
expectations (i.e. the so-called Customer Requirements (CRs), also called the “whats”) to 94 
appropriate technical attributes (i.e. the Engineering Characteristics (ECs), also called the “hows”), 95 
providing their weight and thus their prioritization (Figure 1). 96 
 97 
Figure 1. Scheme of the traditional House of Quality (HoQ) (adapted from [31]). 98 
[Figure 1 near here] 99 
  
 100 
In particular, focusing the attention on occupational safety in the construction industry, two main 101 
approaches were presented. Firstly, Liu and Tsai [34] introduced a two-phase approach (by means 102 
the development of two Houses of Quality (HoQs)) that provides a correlation among construction 103 
items (i.e. working tasks), hazard types and hazard causes (Figure 2), following a top-down 104 
approach for hazard analysis [49].  105 
[Figure 2 near here] 106 
Figure 2. Scheme of the approach proposed by Liu and Tsai [34]. 107 
 108 
To augment the effectiveness of the QFD, both the Analytic Network Process (ANP) and the 109 
Fuzzy-Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) approaches were implemented. More in detail, 110 
the ANP approach was used to address the inner-relationships and inter-relationships among the 111 
HoQ’s components. In addition, the Fuzzy Logic approach was applied to allow a more accurate 112 
analysis. Hence, the study included the use of a fuzzy-FMEA method to complete the risk 113 
assessment activities (i.e. the estimation of the risk level of each hazard cause to determine the 114 
relative preventive and protective measures).  115 
A more comprehensive approach based on the QFD method is the one presented by Bas 116 
[35]. In this study, a three-phase approach is represented (Figure 3), where three HoQs were used to 117 
consider the relationships between tasks and hazards, hazards and events, and events compared with 118 
preventive and protective measures.  119 
[Figure 3 near here] 120 
Figure 3. Scheme of the approach proposed by Bas [35]. 121 
 122 
Compared with the former study, this framework presents a more complete risk assessment 123 
approach, since: 124 
  
• the hazard analysis follows a bottom-up approach [49]; 125 
• it enables the analysis of the relationships between the hazards and the possible 126 
preventive/protective measures; 127 
• the final priority weight of the events (in the third phase) considers the probability of 128 
occurrence, the expected economic cost of each event, and the expected consequences of the 129 
events. 130 
Nevertheless, some drawbacks can be underlined: the validation of the procedure by means 131 
of an empirical application was not performed. Second, the availability of statistical data on the 132 
occurrence of accidents was used to complete the third phase of the procedure, while the correlation 133 
relationships were not considered, limiting the benefits of the HoQ in assessing mutual relationships 134 
among its parameters. In addition, both the above-mentioned approaches are aimed at supporting 135 
engineers at a project level and thus they take into account macro-activities, while the specific 136 
activities that characterize a working task are not addressed sufficiently. Moreover, focusing on the 137 
operator and the activities carried out when performing a specific task, the use of a structured risk 138 
management approach can allow the achievement of safer solutions [50]. Merging these 139 
considerations, we can observe that, when carrying out occupational risk assessment (ORA) 140 
activities, four main issues need to be addressed: 141 
1. a bottom-up approach should be preferred to provide engineers with a thorough procedure 142 
for hazard analysis and prioritization; 143 
2. in order to meet the practical needs of companies that operate in a construction site, the 144 
specific activities in which a working task is articulated need to be analyzed; 145 
3. involving operators in the risk assessment process allows engineers to better define the 146 
specific tasks, the identification of hazards and the determination of risks [51]; 147 
  
4. the evaluation of the inner relationships among the different parameters analyzed (e.g. 148 
working activities, hazardous events and consequences) is significant in order to make their 149 
assessment more consistent. 150 
In the literature, numerous ORA approaches can be found: as remarked by Pinto et al. [52], 151 
in the construction industry one of the most commonly used ORA methods is the Preliminary 152 
Hazard Analysis (PHA). Accordingly, with the goal of accident prevention through planning, more 153 
specific tools were proposed to properly address the above mentioned issues. In particular, the 154 
approaches based on the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) (or Task Hazard Analysis (THA)) [53] stress on 155 
the importance of identifying hazards and the potential accidents starting from the analysis of the 156 
specific activities in which each job can be split, while the assessment criteria are similar to the ones 157 
used in the traditional PHA-based methods [54]. Despite the unquestioned benefits that can be 158 
achieved by the JSA approach, which allows engineers to address the first three ORA issues 159 
mentioned above, some limitations can be found [55-56], especially when considering its capability 160 
to deal with the mutual influences of the different factors analyzed.  161 
To tackle these issues, a QFD-based methodology was developed for the risk assessment of 162 
a working task concerning the use of a machinery in a construction site.  163 
 164 
3. Research approach 165 
The proposed safety assessment tool consists of three main phases, each based on the HoQ 166 
augmented by the ANP approach to assess the inner and outer relationships [57].  167 
3.1. The HoQ augmented by the ANP 168 
The ANP approach uses pairwise comparisons to allow the evaluation and ranking of alternatives 169 
while deciding on the optimal solutions to a complex problem [40, 58-59]. Hence, the use of the 170 
ANP can support engineers in reducing the limitations of the traditional QFD in differentiating the 171 
  
relative importance of different attributes effectively [60]. In Figure 4 a scheme of such an 172 
integration is reported, where the CRs (i.e. the “whats”) correspond to the HoQ’s inputs, while the 173 
ECs (i.e. the “hows”) represent the outputs [61].  174 
[Figure 4 near here] 175 
Figure 4. Scheme of the integration of the ANP approach in the HoQ. 176 
 177 
Accordingly, the augmented HoQ can be represented as in Figure 5, where: 178 
• W1 is an eigenvector representing the weight (i.e. the importance level) of each EC. 179 
• W2 is the correlation matrix representing the inner dependency matrix of CRs. 180 
• W3 is the relationship matrix, where the pairwise comparison of each CR with respect to 181 
each EC is determined. 182 
• W4 is the correlation matrix among representing the  inner dependency matrix of ECs. 183 
• W5 is an eigenvector representing the weight of each EC. 184 
 185 
[Figure 5 near here] 186 
Figure 5. Scheme of the HoQ augmented by the ANP. 187 
 188 
In practice, the integration of the ANP within the HoQ is carried out by means of the 189 
following procedure: 190 
1. Definition of the list of CRs and ECs. 191 
  
2. Definition of the eigenvector W1: pairwise comparisons of CRs with respect to each CR are 192 
carried out taking into account that there is no dependence among the CRs. The output (W1) 193 
is represented by the importance degrees of each CR.  194 
3. Definition of the correlation matrix W2: pairwise comparisons of CRs with respect to each 195 
CR are performed. The output (W2) is represented by the importance degrees of each CR 196 
(inner dependencies). 197 
4. Definition of the eigenvector W3: pairwise comparisons of ECs with respect to each CR are 198 
carried out taking into account that there is no dependence among the ECs. The output is 199 
represented by the relationship matrix W3 that provides the importance degrees of each EC. 200 
5. Definition of the correlation matrix W4: pairwise comparisons of ECs with respect to each 201 
EC are performed. The output (W4) is represented by the importance degrees of each EC 202 
(inner dependencies). 203 
6. Definition of the inter-dependent priorities of CRs: the interdependent weight of CRs is 204 
calculated by means of the following equation: 205 
                                                           WCRs  = (W2 ×	W1)                                                           (1) 206 
7. Definition of the inter-dependent priorities of ECs: the interdependent weight of ECs is 207 
calculated by means of the following equation: 208 
                                                               WECs  = (W4 ×	W3)                                                           (2) 209 
8. Definition of the overall priorities (W5): the overall priorities of the ECs are calculated by 210 
multiplying the four resulting weight vectors/matrices as in the following equation: 211 
                W5  = (W4 × W3) × (W2 ×	W1) = WECs × WCRs                                        (3) 212 
  
As per the criteria used in the pairwise comparisons, the judgment scores reported in Table 1 can be 213 
used [34]. 214 
[Table 1 near here] 215 
Accordingly, to verify the consistency of each pairwise comparison matrix for m elements, the 216 
values reported in Table 2 for the computation of the Random Index (RI) [40] can be used 217 
following equations: 218 
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  (5) 220 
where λmax represents the largest eigenvalue of the pairwise comparison matrix, while CI is the 221 
consistency index. It has to be noted that the consistency ratio of a pairwise comparison matrix has 222 
to be lower than 0.1 to guarantee the consistency in human judgement [34]. 223 
[Table 2 near here] 224 
 225 
3.2. The Hazard Function Deployment (HFD) methodology 226 
Following such a scheme, the proposed methodology provides a bottom-up approach for 227 
hazards identification and assessment, i.e. when focusing on a specific task, the analysis starts from 228 
the identification of the working activities related to such a task, followed by examining the hazards 229 
and the possible hazardous situations and how they can lead to harms [49]. The general scheme of 230 
the proposed approach, called Hazard Function Deployment (HFD), is shown in Figure 6, where the 231 
main phases are the followings:  232 
Phase I. Hazard types’ assessment: from the activities that characterize a certain working task 233 
(e.g. the use of a machinery), hazard types are defined and assessed. 234 
  
Phase II. Hazardous events’ assessment: starting from the type of hazards, hazardous situations 235 
and events are defined and assessed. 236 
Phase III. Hazards effects’ assessment: starting from the hazardous situations and events, effects 237 
and consequences are defined and assessed. 238 
With reference to the scheme proposed in Figure 6, in the name of each matrix and vector 239 
the number of the phase was added. For example, the equation (3) for Phase I becomes: 240 
                        W5I = (W4I × W3I) × (W2I ×	W1I)               (6) 241 
 [Figure 6 near here] 242 
Figure 6. Scheme of the HFD approach. 243 
 244 
The definition of the various parameters of the three HoQs should be carried out with the 245 
support of experts and experienced operators. In fact, on the one hand, the experts’ consultation 246 
concerning the importance of both hazardous situations/events and their possible consequences can 247 
facilitate the risk assessment activities, since the ranking provided already takes into account the 248 
probability factors based on the experts’ know-how. It order to prevent any bias in the assessment 249 
activities carried out by the group of experts, the Delphi technique can be used. Such a tool is a 250 
well-known means of gathering experts' opinions through several rounds of consultation and 251 
controlled feedback of results [62]. In particular, it is a suitable approach when the analysis carried 252 
out is based on a subjective assessment (e.g. the definition of the weights or importance levels) [63].  253 
On the other hand, also the feedback from experienced operators can help the safety 254 
managers in better addressing the implementation of the HoQs, especially for what concern the 255 
definition of the specific activities carried out when performing a task [47]. It has to be noted that in 256 
the present study a working task is the general assignment the operator carries out (e.g. use of the 257 
in-transit concrete mixer). A working task consists of several specific activities (e.g. setting the 258 
machinery, discharge the concrete, cleaning). Moreover, in our model the output of the analysis of 259 
  
the hazardous situations (i.e. the specific working situation during a working activity that exposes 260 
the operator to the hazard) and hazardous events (i.e. how the hazard can cause harm) is synthetized 261 
in the category “hazardous situations and events”. In order to verify the validity of this approach, it 262 
was applied to an empirical case study concerning the use of a truck mixer in a construction site. On 263 
these considerations, in order to define and assess the various parameters of the three HoQs, the 264 
company’s operators are interviewed in order to define the activities related to the use of the work 265 
equipment, including all foreseeable operations, as well as experienced accidents, near misses, and 266 
operative troubles. 267 
The list of the CRs and ECs for each phase, as well as their mutual assessment, can be 268 
defined in collaboration with a group of experts in the field of occupational safety in the 269 
construction industry.  270 
 271 
4. Case Study 272 
The validity of the HFD approach was tested in collaboration with a company that operates in the 273 
construction industry where the use of an in-transit concrete mixer was considered. As far as 274 
accidents related to this type of machinery is concerned, official statistics cannot be considered 275 
exhaustive. In fact, on the one hand data provided by the Italian Workers’ Compensation Authority 276 
(INAIL) provide a detailed information concerning the fatal accidents occurred in recent years 277 
while operating a truck mixer: in Table 3 the number and the type of causalities of fatal accidents 278 
that occurred in the period 2008-2015 are reported [64].  279 
 [Table 3 near here] 280 
On the other hand, information concerning non-fatal accidents, especially when minor 281 
injuries incurred, is often treated with a low amount of detail, while data concerning these injuries 282 
are provided at a macro level (i.e. accidents involving any heavy machinery in construction sites). 283 
  
The study was carried out in collaboration with two small sized companies operating in such a 284 
sector. More in detail, 15 operators were interviewed to gather practical information concerning the 285 
working activities that accomplish the task “use of the in-transit mixer” and the safety problems 286 
they have experienced while performing them. On this, a group of experts was defined, consisting 287 
of 2 company managers (1 per each company) who have experience both as safety managers and 288 
supervisors, and 3 experts belonging to the Italian Workers’ Compensation Authority, who have 289 
experience in machinery safety and ORA in the construction industry. The group was asked to 290 
define the list of activities, the related hazard types, the hazardous events and situations and events, 291 
as well as the potential consequences/possible harms in order to fill the three HoQs (Table 4). 292 
[Table 4 near here] 293 
It has to be noted that in Table 4 the various elements are summarized due to space limits, 294 
since a more formal definition of each of them would have required longer sentences (e.g. instead of 295 
“Direct/indirect contact with electrical parts” a more appropriate sentence to indicate this hazardous 296 
situation should be “The operator is close to a conductive metallic body of the machinery or to an 297 
unprotected/worn out cable”). Then, following the procedure exposed in the previous section, the 298 
ANP-QFD approach was applied. To reduce the potential bias and to respect the privacy concerns 299 
of the companies, the Delphi technique was used in the assessment activities carried out by the 300 
group of experts. More precisely, once collected the information from the operators, two rounds of 301 
consultations were organized by means of questionnaires. While the first round concerned the 302 
definition of the elements of each phase of the procedure (i.e. the list of activities, hazard types, 303 
hazardous events, etc.), the second round concerned the pairwise comparisons. In detail, data used 304 
as input in the meetings were provided by means of structured (in the case of the first round) and 305 
semi-structured (in the case of the pairwise comparisons) questionnaires. It has to be noted that, 306 
although the participants knew each other, individual responses to questions were asked separately 307 
and kept anonymous in the further discussion to determine the final results of each round. 308 
  
4.1 Phase I 309 
In collaboration with the group of experts, the pairwise comparisons among activities and hazard 310 
types were carried out based on the criteria exposed in section 3: 311 
• Eigenvector W1I: the group of experts was asked to respond to a questionnaire, where each 312 
question inquired the relative importance between pairs of activities concerning the goal 313 
(determine important hazard types). calculated as shown in Table 5.  314 
• Matrix  W3I: the comparison among hazard types was carried out considering the impact 315 
level of activities on each of the hazard types. The responses were provided using the 316 
criteria exposed in Table 1. It is worth nothing that when comparing an element of the 317 
matrix to itself (e.g. H1 compared to H1) a score of 1 is given (hence the values of the 318 
diagonal are equal to 1); while the values below the diagonal are the inverse of the 319 
corresponding values above the diagonal. This means that if aij represents the relative 320 
importance of the i-th element compared to the j-th element, then the relative importance of 321 
the j-th element compared to the i-th element is represented by aji = 1/aij. To better clarify 322 
the calculation mechanism, all the matrices used to derive the values for the matrix W3I are 323 
reported in Annex I. 324 
• Matrix W2I: the comparison among the activities was performed using as criterion the 325 
occurrence of accidents (without considering their effects). In other words, the judgement 326 
score of 1 was given when the occurrence of accidents during an activity A was considered 327 
equal to the one of an activity B. Hence, following the same computational process reported 328 
in Annex I, the type of questions used in this case was: “With respect to A1 (arrival, 329 
departure, transit), what is the relative importance of: A1 compared to A2; A1 compared to 330 
A3; A1 compared to A4; etc.?” (Table 6). 331 
• Matrix W4I: the comparison among the hazards was performed using as criterion the 332 
  
relevance of hazard types [34]. Following the same computational process reported in 333 
Annex I, the type of questions used in this case was: “With respect to H1 (mobility), what is 334 
the relative importance of: H11 compared to H2; H1 compared to H3; etc.?”. 335 
[Tables 5-6 near here] 336 
In detail, the final results obtained in the first phase are shown in Table 7, where: 337 
• W4I × W3I provides the interdependent weight of hazard types when compared with 338 
reference to working activities; 339 
•  W2I ×	W1I represents the interdependent weight of working activities when compared with 340 
reference to hazard types; and 341 
•  W5I provides the importance weights of hazard types, i.e. their overall priorities.  342 
[Table 7 near here] 343 
4.2 Phase II 344 
Following the same approach as in Phase I, at this stage the overall priorities of the possible 345 
hazardous events were calculated, as shown in Table 8, where: 346 
• W4II × W3II provides the interdependent weight of hazardous events when compared with 347 
reference to hazardous events; 348 
•  W2II ×	W1II = W2I ×	W1I represents the interdependent weight of hazard types derived from 349 
Phase I; and 350 
•  W5II provides the weights of hazardous events, i.e. their overall priorities.  351 
[Table 8 near here] 352 
The numerical values of each matrix of Phase II are reported in Annex II. 353 
  
4.3 Phase III 354 
Similarly, in the last phase of the procedure the overall priorities of the possible consequences were 355 
calculated, as shown in Table 9 and Table 10, where: 356 
• W2II ×	W1II represents the interdependent weight of hazardous events derived from Phase II 357 
(Table 9);  358 
• W4III × W3III provides the interdependent weight of possible consequences when compared 359 
with reference to hazardous events (Table 10); 360 
• W5III provides the weights of the possible consequences (Table 9). 361 
[Table 9-10 near here] 362 
The numerical values of each matrix of Phase III are reported in Annex II. 363 
5. Discussion of results 364 
5.1. The case study outputs 365 
The results obtained from the case study can be summarized in the following figures, where the 366 
weights (i.e. the overall priorities) of the hazard types (Figure 7), the hazardous events (Figure 8) 367 
and the possible consequences (Figure 9) are shown (note that the values of the “y” axes are 368 
dimensionless, as they are normalized values).  369 
[Figure 7 near here] 370 
Figure 7. Weights of hazard types. 371 
 372 
[Figure 8 near here] 373 
Figure 8. Weights of hazardous events. 374 
  
 375 
[Figure 9 near here] 376 
Figure 9. Weights of possible consequences. 377 
 378 
According to these data, the most relevant consequence while operating the truck mixer is 379 
represented by C2, i.e. scrapes, lacerations, and bruises. Such a result augments the information 380 
provided by accident statistics, since this type of injuries are hardly reported as they normally 381 
require a few days to recover from. In fact, according to law requirements, if an accident causes an 382 
injury recoverable within three days (apart from the day when the accident occurred), it should not 383 
be reported. Hence, while accidents that caused serious injuries are reported correctly, accidents 384 
with minor consequences (e.g. those ones requiring few days of recovery) are reported with fewer 385 
details. Therefore, official statistics on accidents at work provide incomplete information on what 386 
happens in reality regarding the assessment of minor injuries. Moreover, it is consistent with results 387 
obtained in the second phase of the procedure, where the most important hazardous event concerns 388 
slipping when getting in/out from the truck’s cabin (E1), followed by impacts while discharging the 389 
drum (E9). In other words, the results show (see Figures 8 and 9) the relevance of accidents related 390 
to slipping and impacts, which mainly lead to scrapes, contusions, lacerations, and bruises injuries, 391 
consistently with the findings of Lipscomb et al. [65]. This is also in line with findings by Shibuya 392 
et al. [66], who pointed out that slips and trips should be considered a contributing factor for 393 
occupational injuries among truck drivers. Accordingly, these results also confirm implications 394 
provided by Aminbakhsh et al. [67], who reported that “trips and falls” together with risks related to 395 
the use of “machinery and equipment” are among the most significant risks in the construction 396 
industry. This can help engineers in carrying out risk assessment more correctly and easily. In other 397 
words, when we consider the traditional approach followed to perform the hazard analysis, for 398 
instance by means of the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) method [52, 68], the likelihood of the 399 
  
events is usually classified into rather broad categories (e.g. using a scale ranging from 1 (very 400 
unlikely) to 5 (very likely)). Hence, in our case study, we should assign a score of 5 to C2 and 1 to 401 
C15 (death), which means that the ratio between them is 1 to 5, while following the proposed 402 
procedure such a relationship is extended to 1 to 20 (see Table 11). This wider range represents a 403 
value much closer to the reality.  404 
To better evaluate these differences, the group of experts was asked to perform the 405 
occupational risk assessment following the rules of the PHA method [69] and the hints provided by 406 
the report ISO/TR 14121-2 [49]. More in detail, each risk type (Rs) corresponds to the occurrence 407 
of the related hazardous event (i.e. R1, R2, R3 etc. are the risks related to the occurrence of E1, E3, 408 
E3 etc. that lead to the consequence C1, C2, C3, etc. respectively). As for the traditional approach, 409 
the risk level (RT ) was estimated by means of the equation (7): 410 
                        RT = P × S               (7) 411 
where P is the probability of occurrence of a hazardous event estimated through a 1 to 5 412 
scale (1 = very unlikely – 5 = very likely) and S indicates the severity of its consequences 413 
(estimated by means of a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 = minor effects and 5 = catastrophic effects (e.g. 414 
death)). The estimation of the risk level in accordance with the HFD methodology (RHFD) was 415 
performed using the output of the proposed approach: the weight of the possible consequences (Cs) 416 
determined at the end of Phase III was multiplied per the corresponding values of Severity (S) 417 
obtained with the traditional approach (Table 11). 418 
[Table 11 near here] 419 
More precisely, the comparison between the results of the two risk assessment activities is 420 
shown in Figure 10, where the solid line connects the values (i.e. the importance levels) related to 421 
the risks computed following the traditional approach (RT), while the broken line represents the 422 
results achieved by means of the HFD approach (RHFD). These results bring to light that significant 423 
  
differences occur depending on the approach used to calculate risks. First, it has to be pointed out 424 
that the traditional approach provides slight differences among the various risks: i.e. risks vary in a 425 
small range of values of about 5.5 %. Conversely, the HFD approach leads to a higher level of 426 
differentiation of the risks’ values: i.e. circa 11.5 %. Secondly, the HFD approach allows engineers 427 
to clearly distinguish the difference of one risk from another since risks with a similar weight were 428 
not found, while some strong resemblances can be observed among the results achieved through the 429 
traditional approach. In addition, also when hazardous situations that might lead to diseases were 430 
evaluated, the HFD approach provided a clearer level of resolution, as in the case of R10 (stress and 431 
fatigue). 432 
[Figure 11 near here] 433 
Figure 11. Risks’ values determined through the traditional (RT - solid line) and the HFD (RHFD - 434 
broken line) approaches. 435 
 436 
The results achieved were considered very positive from the group of experts, especially for 437 
what concerns the assessment of minor injuries, as their impact is often underestimated when 438 
performing traditional risk assessment. Hence, these issues need to be addressed better at the 439 
company level by means of a more specific training of the operators. 440 
5.2. The methodology 441 
From a safety management point of view, the proposed approach does not start from a standardized 442 
set of health and safety risks, but it relies on a process-oriented analysis considering all the activities 443 
related to a specific task. Hence, it provides a contribution to the research hints and clues stressed 444 
by Zhou et al. [21], who underlined the lack of construction safety research at the working task 445 
level. This is also in line with Gangolells et al. [16], who remarked the lack of construction safety 446 
research on the specific working tasks. Commonly with other research works in different fields (e.g. 447 
  
in [70-72]), this study found that the coordinated use of QFD and ANP can offer a more precise 448 
analysis due to the integration of interdependent relationships among the attributes, providing 449 
consistent information as to improve the safety conditions at the company level. Hence, such an 450 
approach allowed us to effectively correlate working activities related to a specific task (such as the 451 
use of a working equipment), hazardous events and possible consequences. 452 
These practical implications for companies are in line with research clues provided by Seker 453 
et al. [45] and Samantra et al. [73]), and can be considered beneficial when considering that 454 
traditional risk assessment activities provide a relatively limited scoring “resolution” (i.e. when 455 
different risks get the same score as well as when the scores vary in a limited range of values), 456 
especially when data concerning the likelihood of occurrence are poor. Such an aspect is quite 457 
relevant in SMEs, as observed by Bohm and Harris [74], who carried out a study on risk perception 458 
and risk assessment of dumper drivers operating in construction sites. On the contrary, the HFD 459 
approach allows a more accurate assessment of the risks, ensuring a clearer ranking of them that can 460 
lead to a more efficacious decision making. This result, answering our research question, also 461 
accomplishes research suggestions provided by Kines et al. [75], who stressed on the importance of 462 
providing a more thorough risk analysis approach to bring to light the relevance of minor injuries 463 
and uncomfortable working situation. In other words, HFD provides a more precise risk analysis 464 
and ranking than the traditional risk assessment approaches, even when the availability of official 465 
statistics concerning workers’ accidents is limited.  466 
Finally, the HFD approach was compared with the above mentioned studies from the 467 
literature concerning the application of the QFD method for risk assessment in the construction 468 
industry. As summarized in Table 12, the proposed approach can provide more practical insights for 469 
risk assessment of working tasks (e.g. the use of machinery or work equipment). This accomplishes 470 
the need of providing the improvement of safety conditions not relying on the compliance with 471 
normative requirements only, but also considering the practical context of working activities [76]. 472 
 473 
  
[Table 12 near here] 474 
Hence, it has to be pointed out that such an approach can accomplish the need of developing 475 
new risk analysis methods to identify and assess risks in an acceptable way so that the information 476 
is reliable for decision making [3, 32, 77], augmenting the knowledge on the use of QFD in the 477 
safety management context.  478 
5.3. Practical implications 479 
From the practical point of view, the HFD methodology extends the benefits of the traditional JSA 480 
approach. In fact, on the one hand, it relies on a process of identifying activity-related factors that 481 
may result in potential hazards, as for example the use of a work equipment, with the aim of 482 
proposing rules to eliminate or control these hazards. On the other hand, the HFD provides a more 483 
structured framework, which takes into account the mutual influences that might arise among the 484 
different hazards and the related potential effects, augmenting the effectiveness of risk assessment 485 
activities, since carrying out risk assessment in a sequential manner (i.e. cause-effect analysis) is 486 
insufficient to consider the complexity of these interactions. Moreover, although the proposed 487 
methodology consists in the definition of a series of matrices that make the HFD’s process more 488 
complex than other diffused ORA approaches (e.g. the JSA), it is worth nothing that the HFD 489 
assessment criteria rely on simple pairwise comparisons, enabling a clearer understanding and 490 
differentiation of the results. 491 
Another contribution of the paper is the presentation of a concrete case of occupational risk 492 
assessment related to the use of a diffused work equipment in the construction sector, including the 493 
exemplification of each step of the HFD methodology. This contribution is more relevant to practice 494 
in this industry, but it is also useful to advance the scientific knowledge regarding ontologies in the 495 
adoption of task-based ORA models. 496 
  
5.4. Limitations  497 
However, despite these positive aspects, the present study presents some limitations. Firstly, the 498 
computational efforts required to apply the ANP approach might be problematic and time-499 
consuming for unexperienced practitioners. The development of a procedure based on the 500 
implementation of an ease-to-use software can certainly reduce this drawback, making the usability 501 
of the HFD methodology larger and more suitable for an unexperienced audience. Similarly, the 502 
role of costs related to safety measures should also be taken into account to provide companies with 503 
a more complete approach [78-80]. Then, in the experts group, a difficulty emerged when the 504 
effects of noise and vibrations were considered, hence these concerns not taken into account in the 505 
final results. To address these limitations, a more detailed differentiation of possible consequences 506 
might help engineers in providing better results. The implementation of fuzzy logic could also 507 
facilitate the assessment of this type of hazardous effects, further reducing possible errors or 508 
inconsistencies in the evaluation [34, 81]. Finally, it has to be underlined that the results were 509 
obtained from a single case study. Hence, while the use of a single case-study as a research tool for 510 
exploratory investigation and to generate new understandings is recognized by several authors [82-511 
83], caution is needed when generalizing the findings [84]. 512 
 513 
6. Conclusions 514 
This study proposes a novel tool, based on the integrated use of QFD and ANP, which is aimed at 515 
supporting safety managers in performing risk assessment of working tasks in the construction 516 
sector. Practical results showed that the HFD approach can be used for the risk assessment 517 
effectively, allowing engineers to obtain the priority of hazards and possible consequences, and thus 518 
of the interventions aimed at increasing the safety level of the working activities considering the 519 
mutual relationships among these factors, while reducing the ambiguity of qualitative assessment 520 
criteria used in traditional risk assessment activities. Hence, this study can provide a basis for the 521 
  
development of occupational risk assessment methodologies and for practitioners in this type of 522 
industry. This article is the result of an initial stage of development of the HFD approach: to 523 
augment its validity reducing the above-mentioned limitations further work is needed. Currently, 524 
both the development of a procedure based on the use of an ease-to-use software as well as its 525 
application to different industries, e.g. the agricultural sector that presents similar peculiarities from 526 
the occupational safety point of view [85-87], are being analyzed. 527 
 528 
 529 
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Table 1. The ANP judgement scores when considering two characteristics A and B. 
 
Judgement Rule Score 
Equal 
If A and B have the same behaviour/performance in relation to the assessment 
criterion 
1 
Moderate If the performance of A is moderately higher than the B’s one. 2-3 
Strong If the performance of A is strongly higher than the B’s one. 4-5 
Very strong If the performance of A is much higher than the B’s one. 6-7 
Extreme If the performance of A is extremely higher than the B’s one. 8-9 
 
  
  
Table 2. Values of the Random Index (RI) depending on the number of elements [34]. 
 
Number of 
elements (m) 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Value of the 
Random Index 
(RI) 
0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.49 1.52 1.54 1.56 1.58 1.59 
 
  
  
Table 3. Types of causal factors that lead to fatal accidents in the period 2008-2015 (source: [59]). 
 
CAUSAL FACTORS 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Hit by falling materials when 
operating the machinery 
3        
Unintended movement of 
the truck/Roll over 
  2  1 1 1  
Contact with the machinery 
parts 
 1     1  
Unintended starting of the 
machinery 
   1    1 
Hit by ejected materials 1        
Electric shock (direct) 1  1    1  
Electric shock (indirect) 1 2     1  
 
 
 
  
  
Table 4. List of activities (As), hazard types (Hs), hazardous events (Es), and possible consequences 
(C). 
 
ACTIVITIES (As) HAZARD TYPES (Hs) 
A1 Arrival/Departure  H1 Mobility 
A2 Preparation H2 Mechanical 
A3 Direct discharge H3 Electrical 
A4 Discharge into a concrete pump H4 Environmental 
A5 Discharge into a bucket H5 Materials 
A6 Final operations H6 Ergonomics 
  H7 Interferences 
    
HAZARDOUS EVENTS (Es) CONSEQUENCES/POSSIBLE HARMS (Cs) 
E1 Slipping when getting in/out of the truck C1 Intoxication 
E2 Contact with the rotating drum while operating C2 Scrapes, Lacerations, Bruises, Abrasions 
E3 
Contact with heated surfaces while operating the 
drum 
C3 Fractures 
E4 
Unexpected starting of the machinery while 
operating the drum 
C4 Cutting, Severing upper limbs 
E5 
Unintended movement of the truck/Roll over 
while driving  
C5 Cutting, Severing lower limbs 
E6 Falls from heights when working on the drum C6 Head injuries 
E7 Direct/indirect contact with electrical parts C7 Hearing illnesses 
E8 
Projection of high pressure fluids/materials while 
discharging the drum 
C8 Eye illnesses  
E9 Impacts while discharging the drum  C9 Respiratory illnesses 
E10 
Slipping/Low falls, Trips while discharging the 
drum 
C10 Stress, Fatigue 
E11 
Cutting, severing during final operations (cleaning, 
maintenance, settings) 
C11 Burns (including abrasive effects of sand)  
E12 
Inhalation or contact with dust and hazardous 
substances while operating the drum (caustic 
effect of the fresh concrete because of its alkaline 
nature) 
C12 Back injuries 
E13 Entanglement, trapping while cleaning the drum C13 Thorax injuries 
E14 Severing, cutting while cleaning the drum C14 Loss of muscle control (electrical shock) 
  C15 Death 
 
  
  
 
Table 5. Correlation matrix used to calculate the eigenvector W1I. 
 
Activities (As) Average 
values 
W1I 
 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
A1 1.000 7.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 3.000 3.714 0.472 
A2 0.143 1.000 0.333 0.333 0.333 0.250 0.331 0.042 
A3 0.200 3.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.765 0.097 
A4 0.200 0.167 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.472 0.060 
A5 0.200 3.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.333 0.765 0.097 
A6 0.333 4.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 1.000 1.817 0.231 
 
  
  
Table 6. Results of the pairwise comparisons to compute the relationship matrix W2I. 
 
W2I (Correlation Matrix) 
 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
A1 0.280 0.247 0.247 0.247 0.247 0.227 
A2 0.046 0.044 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.042 
A3 0.102 0.100 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.100 
A4 0.102 0.100 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.100 
A5 0.102 0.100 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.100 
A6 0.368 0.460 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.530 
 
  
  
Table 7. Final results of Phase I, where W5I provides the weights of hazards (Hs). 
 
 
W4I x W3I  
W2I x W1I  
 
W5I  
 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6   
H1 0.387 0.358 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.349  A1 0.2580  H1 0.3849 
H2 0.174 0.162 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.158  A2 0.0473  H2 0.1727 
H3 0.031 0.029 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.028  A3 0.1034  H3 0.0310 
H4 0.074 0.066 0.082 0.082 0.082 0.063  A4 0.1034  H4 0.0721 
H5 0.073 0.067 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.065  A5 0.1034  H5 0.0723 
H6 0.085 0.081 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.079  A6 0.3896  H6 0.0850 
H7 0.177 0.165 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.158  
  
 H7 0.1740 
 
  
  
Table 8. Final results of Phase II, where W5II provides the weights of the hazardous events (Es). 
 
W4II x W3II 
 W2II x W1II  W5II 
  H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 
  
E1 0.195 0.196 0.197 0.195 0.195 0.194 0.196 
 
H1 0.382 
 
E1 0.194 
E2 0.088 0.089 0.090 0.089 0.089 0.088 0.089 
 
H2 0.175 
 
E2 0.088 
E3 0.085 0.086 0.086 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 
 
H3 0.031 
 
E3 0.085 
E4 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 
 
H4 0.068 
 
E4 0.036 
E5 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 
 
H5 0.070 
 
E5 0.036 
E6 0.055 0.054 0.055 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.055 
 
H6 0.086 
 
E6 0.054 
E7 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
 
H7 0.181 
 
E7 0.014 
E8 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.064 
    
E8 0.063 
E9 0.134 0.134 0.135 0.134 0.134 0.133 0.134 
    
E9 0.133 
E10 0.115 0.116 0.117 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.116 
    
E10 0.115 
E11 0.088 0.088 0.089 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.089 
    
E11 0.088 
E12 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063 
    
E12 0.063 
E13 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
    
E13 0.015 
E14 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
    
E14 0.011 
 
  
  
 
Table 9. Final results of Phase III (a), where W5III provides the weights of the possible 
consequences (Cs). 
 
W2III x W1III 
 
W5III Ranking 
E1 0.193 
 
C1 0.037 11 
E2 0.088 
 
C2 0.216 1 
E3 0.084 
 
C3 0.114 4 
E4 0.036 
 
C4 0.116 2 
E5 0.036 
 
C5 0.114 3 
E6 0.054 
 
C6 0.095 5 
E7 0.014 
 
C7 0.040 10 
E8 0.064 
 
C8 0.057 7 
E9 0.133 
 
C9 0.056 8 
E10 0.115 
 
C10 0.068 6 
E11 0.088 
 
C11 0.042 9 
E12 0.062 
 
C12 0.033 12 
E13 0.015 
 
C13 0.031 13 
E14 0.011 
 
C14 0.014 14 
  
 
C15 0.009 15 
 
 
  
Table 10. Final results of Phase III (b): relationship matrix. 
 
W4III x W3III 
  E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10 E11 E12 E13 E14 
C1 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.037 
C2 0.214 0.227 0.224 0.222 0.220 0.215 0.210 0.210 0.221 0.213 0.219 0.211 0.216 0.216 
C3 0.113 0.118 0.118 0.117 0.118 0.113 0.111 0.111 0.118 0.113 0.117 0.112 0.114 0.114 
C4 0.115 0.119 0.118 0.120 0.120 0.114 0.113 0.113 0.120 0.114 0.119 0.113 0.115 0.115 
C5 0.113 0.117 0.117 0.118 0.118 0.113 0.111 0.112 0.118 0.113 0.117 0.112 0.114 0.114 
C6 0.094 0.098 0.098 0.097 0.096 0.094 0.092 0.093 0.097 0.094 0.096 0.093 0.095 0.095 
C7 0.040 0.042 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.040 0.041 0.039 0.040 0.040 
C8 0.056 0.059 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.058 0.056 0.057 0.056 0.057 0.057 
C9 0.056 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.058 0.056 0.057 0.055 0.057 0.057 
C10 0.068 0.071 0.070 0.070 0.069 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.070 0.068 0.069 0.067 0.069 0.069 
C11 0.042 0.044 0.043 0.044 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.041 0.044 0.042 0.043 0.041 0.043 0.043 
C12 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.033 
C13 0.030 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.032 0.030 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.031 
C14 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.015 
C15 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 
  
Table 11. Comparison of the risk assessment’s results. 
 
List of 
Consequences 
(Cs)  
Severity 
(1-5 scale) 
HFD approach Traditional approach 
Values of Risk 
(normalized) 
Weight of 
Consequences 
(normalized) 
RHFD  
(C × S)  
P  
(1-5 scale) 
RT  
(RT = P × S) 
Risk 
code 
RT  RHFD  
C1 2 3.57 7.14 3 6 R1 6.67 2.91 
C2 1 20.70 20.70 5 5 R2 5.56 8.45 
C3 3 10.95 32.85 2 6 R3 6.67 13.41 
C4 3 11.10 33.30 3 9 R4 10.00 13.60 
C5 3 10.95 32.85 3 9 R5 10.00 13.41 
C6 3 9.07 27.21 3 9 R6 10.00 11.10 
C7 2 3.83 7.66 2 4 R7 4.44 3.13 
C8 2 5.42 10.84 2 4 R8 4.44 4.43 
C9 2 5.41 10.82 2 4 R9 4.44 4.42 
C10 3 6.54 19.62 2 6 R10 6.67 8.01 
C11 3 4.06 12.18 2 6 R11 6.67 4.97 
C12 3 3.18 9.54 2 6 R12 6.67 3.90 
C13 3 2.94 8.82 2 6 R13 6.67 3.60 
C14 5 1.39 6.95 1 5 R14 5.56 2.84 
C15 5 0.89 4.45 1 5 R15 5.56 1.82 
Probability (P) = 1 (very unlikely) – 5 (very likely); Severity (S) = 1 (minor effects) - 5 (Catastrophic).  
 
  
  
 
Table 12. Comparison of the results of prior studies with the present study. 
 
Method  Approach 
n.o of phases 
(HoQs) 
input output 
Correlations 
assessment 
Risk 
assessment 
Practical case 
study 
Data source 
Liu and 
Tsai [34] 
Top-down 2 
Construction 
items 
Hazard causes ANP 
Augmentation 
by FMEA 
Yes  
Company 
experts 
Bas [35] Bottom-up 3 
Set of working 
tasks 
General set of 
preventive/pr
otective 
measures 
No 
General 
assessment 
related to 
working tasks 
No  
Construction 
expert / 
Official 
statistics  
Present 
study 
Bottom-up 3 
Activities that 
accomplish a 
working task 
Specific set of 
preventive/ 
protective 
measures 
ANP 
Specific 
assessment 
related to 
working 
activities 
Yes  
Group of 
experts and 
operators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
